Counterinsugency
Manual
How
to train death squads and quash revolutions from San Salvador
to Iraq
JULIAN
ASSANGE (investigative editor) Monday June 15,
2008
How to covertly train paramilitaries, censor the press, ban
unions, employ terrorists, conduct warrantless searches,
suspend habeas corpus, conceal breaches of the Geneva
Convention and make the population love it
Wikileaks has released a sensitive
219 page US military counterinsurgency
manual.
The manual, Foreign Internal Defense Tactics Techniques
and Procedures for Special Forces (1994, 2004), may be
critically described as "what we learned about running
death squads and propping up corrupt government in Latin
America and how to apply it to other places". Its contents
are both history defining for Latin America and, given the
continued role of US Special Forces in the suppression of
insurgencies, including in Iraq and Afghanistan, history
making.
The leaked manual, which has been verified with military
sources, is the official US Special Forces doctrine for
Foreign Internal Defense or FID.
FID operations are designed to prop up "friendly" governments
facing popular revolution or guerilla insurgency. FID
interventions are often covert or quasi-covert due to the
unpopular nature of the governments being supported ("In
formulating a realistic policy for the use of advisors, the
commander must carefully gauge the psychological climate of
the HN [Host Nation] and the United States.")
The manual directly advocates training paramilitaries,
pervasive surveillance, censorship, press control and
restrictions on labor unions & political parties. It
directly advocates warrantless searches, detainment without
charge and (under varying circumstances) the suspension of
habeas corpus.
It
directly advocates employing terrorists or prosecuting
individuals for terrorism who are not terrorists, running
false flag operations and concealing human rights abuses from
journalists. And it repeatedly advocates the use of
subterfuge and "psychological operations" (propaganda) to
make these and other "population & resource control"
measures more palatable.
The content has been particularly informed by the long United
States involvement in El Salvador.
In 2005 a number of credible media reports suggested the
Pentagon was intensely debating "the Salvador option" for
Iraq.[1]. According to the New York Times Magazine:
The template for Iraq today is not Vietnam, with which it has
often been compared, but El Salvador, where a right-wing
government backed by the United States fought a leftist
insurgency in a 12-year war beginning in 1980. The cost was
high — more than 70,000 people were killed, most of them
civilians, in a country with a population of just six
million. Most of the killing and torturing was done by the
army and the right-wing death squads affiliated with it.
According to an Amnesty International report in 2001,
violations committed by the army and associated groups
included ‘‘extrajudicial executions, other unlawful killings,
‘disappearances’ and torture. . . . Whole villages were
targeted by the armed forces and their inhabitants
massacred.’’ As part of President Reagan’s policy of
supporting anti-Communist forces, hundreds of millions of
dollars in United States aid was funneled to the Salvadoran
Army, and a team of 55 Special Forces advisers, led for
several years by Jim Steele, trained front-line battalions
that were accused of significant human rights abuses.
The same article states James Steele and many other former
Central American Special Forces "military advisors" have now
been appointed at a high level to Iraq.
In 1993 a United Nations truth commission on El Salvador,
which examined 22,000 atrocities that occurred during the
twelve-year civil war, attributed 85 percent of the abuses to
the US-backed El Salvador military and its paramilitary death
squads.
It is worth noting what the US Ambassador to El Salvador,
Robert E. White (now the president for the Center for
International Policy) had to say as early as 1980, in State
Department documents obtained under the Freedom of
Information Act:
The major, immediate threat to the existence of this
government is the right-wing violence. In the city of San
Salvador, the hired thugs of the extreme right, some of them
well-trained Cuban and Nicaraguan terrorists, kill moderate
left leaders and blow up government buildings. In the
countryside, elements of the security forces torture and kill
the campesinos, shoot up their houses and burn their crops.
At least two hundred refugees from the countryside arrive
daily in the capital city. This campaign of terror is
radicalizing the rural areas just as surely as Somoza's
National Guard did in Nicaragua. Unfortunately, the command
structure of the army and the security forces either
tolerates or encourages this activity. These senior officers
believe or pretend to believe that they are eliminating the
guerillas.[2]
Selected extracts follow. Note that the manual is 219 pages
long and contains substantial material throughout. These
extracts should merely be considered representative. Emphasis
has been added for further selectivity. The full manual can
be found at US Special Forces counterinsurgency manual FM
31-20-3.
DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Distribution authorized to U.S.
Government agencies and their contractors only to protect
technical or operational information from automatic
dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by
other means. This determination was made on 5 December 2003.
Other requests for this document must be referred to
Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare
Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DTD-SFD, Fort Bragg, North
Carolina 28310-5000.
Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that must prevent
disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.
Counterintelligence
Most
of the counterintelligence measures used will be overt in
nature and aimed at protecting installations, units, and
information and detecting espionage, sabotage, and
subversion. Examples of counterintelligence measures to use
are
• Background investigations and records checks of persons in
sensitive positions and persons whose loyalty may be
questionable.
• Maintenance of files on organizations, locations, and
individuals of counterintelligence interest.
• Internal security inspections of installations and units.
• Control of civilian movement within government-controlled
areas.
• Identification systems to minimize the chance of insurgents
gaining access to installations or moving freely.
• Unannounced searches and raids on suspected meeting places.
• Censorship.
PSYOP [Psychological Operations]
are essential to the success of
PRC [Population &
Resources Control].
For maximum effectiveness, a strong psychological
operations effort is directed toward the families of the
insurgents and their popular support base. The PSYOP
aspect of the PRC program tries to make the imposition of
control more palatable to the people by relating the
necessity of controls to their safety and well-being.
PSYOP efforts also try to create a favorable national or
local government image and counter the effects of the
insurgent propaganda effort.
Control Measures
SF [US Special Forces] can advise and assist HN [Host Nation]
forces in developing and implementing control measures. Among
these measures are the following:
• Security Forces. Police and other security forces use PRC
[Population & Resources Control] measures to deprive the
insurgent of support and to identify and locate members of
his infrastructure. Appropriate PSYOP [Psychological
Operations] help make these measures more acceptable to the
population by explaining their need. The government informs
the population that the PRC measures may cause an
inconvenience but are necessary due to the actions of the
insurgents.
• Restrictions. Rights on the legality of detention or
imprisonment of personnel (for example, habeas corpus) may be
temporarily suspended. This measure must be taken as a last
resort, since it may provide the insurgents with an effective
propaganda theme. PRC [Population & Resources Control]
measures can also include curfews or blackouts, travel
restrictions, and restricted residential areas such as
protected villages or resettlement areas. Registration and
pass systems and control of sensitive items (resources
control) and critical supplies such as weapons, food, and
fuel are other PRC measures. Checkpoints, searches,
roadblocks; surveillance, censorship, and press control; and
restriction of activity that applies to selected groups
(labor unions, political groups and the like) are further PRC
measures.
Legal Considerations. All restrictions, controls, and DA
measures must be governed by the legality of these methods
and their impact on the populace. In countries where
government authorities do not have wide latitude in
controlling the population, special or emergency legislation
must be enacted. This emergency legislation may include a
form of martial law permitting government forces to search
without warrant, to detain without bringing formal charges,
and to execute other similar actions.
Psychological
Operations
PSYOP can support the mission by discrediting the insurgent
forces to neutral groups, creating dissension among the
insurgents themselves, and supporting defector programs.
Divisive programs create dissension, disorganization, low
morale, subversion, and defection within the insurgent
forces. Also important are national programs to win
insurgents over to the government side with offers of amnesty
and rewards. Motives for surrendering can range from personal
rivalries and bitterness to disillusionment and
discouragement. Pressure from the security forces has
persuasive power.
Intelligence personnel must consider the parameters within
which a revolutionary movement operates. Frequently, they
establish a centralized intelligence processing center to
collect and coordinate the amount of information required to
make long-range intelligence estimates. Long-range
intelligence focuses on the stable factors existing in an
insurgency. For example, various demographic factors (ethnic,
racial, social, economic, religious, and political
characteristics of the area in which the underground movement
takes places) are useful in identifying the members of the
underground. Information about the underground organization
at national, district, and local level is basic in FID
[Foreign Internal Defense] and/or IDAD operations. Collection
of specific short-range intelligence about the rapidly
changing variables of a local situation is critical.
Intelligence
personnel must gather information on members of the
underground, their movements, and their methods. Biographies
and photos of suspected underground members, detailed
information on their homes, families, education, work
history, and associates are important features of short-range
intelligence.
Destroying its tactical units is not enough to defeat the
enemy. The insurgent's underground cells or infrastructure
must be neutralized first because the infrastructure is his
main source of tactical intelligence and political control.
Eliminating the infrastructure within an area achieves two
goals: it ensures the government's control of the area, and
it cuts off the enemy's main source of intelligence. An
intelligence and operations command center (IOCC) is needed
at district or province level. This organization becomes the
nerve center for operations against the insurgent
infrastructure. Information on insurgent infrastructure
targets should come from such sources as the national police
and other established intelligence nets and agents and
individuals (informants).
The highly specialized and sensitive nature of clandestine
intelligence collection demands specially selected and highly
trained agents. Information from clandestine sources is often
highly sensitive and requires tight control to protect the
source. However, tactical information upon which a combat
response can be taken should be passed to the appropriate
tactical level.
The spotting, assessment, and recruitment of an agent is not
a haphazard process regardless of the type agent being
sought. During the assessment phase, the case officer
determines the individual's degree of intelligence, access to
target, available or necessary cover, and motivation. He
initiates the recruitment and coding action only after he
determines the individual has the necessary attributes to
fulfill the needs.
All agents are closely observed and those that are not
reliable are relieved. A few well-targeted, reliable agents
are better and more economical than a large number of poor
ones.
A system is needed to evaluate the agents and the information
they submit. The maintenance of an agent master dossier
(possibly at the SFOD B level) can be useful in evaluating
the agent on the value and quality of information he has
submitted. The dossier must contain a copy of the agent's
source data report and every intelligence report he
submitted.
Security forces can induce individuals among the general
populace to become informants. Security forces use various
motives (civic-mindedness, patriotism, fear, punishment
avoidance, gratitude, revenge or jealousy, financial rewards)
as persuasive arguments. They use the assurance of protection
from reprisal as a major inducement. Security forces must
maintain the informant's anonymity and must conceal the
transfer of information from the source to the security
agent. The security agent and the informant may prearrange
signals to coincide with everyday behavior.
Surveillance, the covert observation of persons and places,
is a principal method of gaining and confirming intelligence
information. Surveillance techniques naturally vary with the
requirements of different situations. The basic procedures
include mechanical observation (wiretaps or concealed
microphones), observation from fixed locations, and physical
surveillance of subjects.
Whenever a suspect is apprehended during an operation, a
hasty interrogation takes place to gain immediate information
that could be of tactical value. The most frequently used
methods for gathering information (map studies and aerial
observation), however, are normally unsuccessful. Most PWs
cannot read a map. When they are taken on a visual
reconnaissance flight, it is usually their first flight and
they cannot associate an aerial view with what they saw on
the ground.
The most successful interrogation method consists of a map
study based on terrain information received from the
detainee. The interrogator first asks the detainee what the
sun's direction was when he left the base camp. From this
information, he can determine a general direction. The
interrogator then asks the detainee how long it took him to
walk to the point where he was captured. Judging the terrain
and the detainee's health, the interrogator can determine a
general radius in which the base camp can be found (he can
use an overlay for this purpose). He then asks the detainee
to identify significant terrain features he saw on each day
of his journey, (rivers, open areas, hills, rice paddies,
swamps). As the detainee speaks and his memory is jogged, the
interrogator finds these terrain features on a current map
and gradually plots the detainee's route to finally locate
the base camp.
If the interrogator is unable to speak the detainee's
language, he interrogates through an interpreter who received
a briefing beforehand. A recorder may also assist him. If the
interrogator is not familiar with the area, personnel who are
familiar with the area brief him before the interrogation and
then join the interrogation team. The recorder allows the
interrogator a more free-flowing interrogation. The recorder
also lets a knowledgeable interpreter elaborate on points the
detainee has mentioned without the interrogator interrupting
the continuity established during a given sequence. The
interpreter can also question certain inaccuracies, keeping
pressure on the subject. The interpreter and the interrogator
have to be well trained to work as a team. The interpreter
has to be familiar with the interrogation procedures. His
preinterrogation briefings must include information on the
detainee's health, the circumstances resulting in his
detention, and the specific information required. A
successful interrogation is contingent upon continuity and a
welltrained interpreter. A tape recorder (or a recorder
taking notes) enhances continuity by freeing the interrogator
from time-consuming administrative tasks.
Political
Structures
A
tightly disciplined party organization, formally structured
to parallel the existing government hierarchy, may be found
at the center of some insurgent movements. In most instances,
this organizational structure will consist of committed
organizations at the village, district province, and national
levels. Within major divisions and sections of an insurgent
military headquarters, totally distinct but parallel command
channels exist. There are military chains of command and
political channels of control. The party ensures complete
domination over the military structure using its own parallel
organization. It dominates through a political division in an
insurgent military headquarters, a party cell or group in an
insurgent military unit, or a political military officer.
Special
Intelligence-Gathering Operations
Alternative intelligence-gathering techniques and sources,
such as doppelganger or pseudo operations, can be tried and
used when it is hard to obtain information from the civilian
populace. These pseudo units are usually made up of
ex-guerrilla and/or security force personnel posing as
insurgents. They circulate among the civilian populace and,
in some cases, infiltrate guerrilla units to gather
information on guerrilla movements and its support
infrastructure.
Much time and effort must be used to persuade insurgents to
switch allegiance and serve with the security forces.
Prospective candidates must be properly screened and then
given a choice of serving with the HN [Host Nation] security
forces or facing prosecution under HN law for terrorist
crimes.
Government security force units and teams of varying size
have been used in infiltration operations against underground
and guerrilla forces. They have been especially effective in
getting information on underground security and
communications systems, the nature and extent of civilian
support and underground liaison, underground supply methods,
and possible collusion between local government officials and
the underground.
Before
such a unit can be properly trained and disguised, however,
much information about the appearance, mannerisms, and
security procedures of enemy units must be gathered. Most of
this information comes from defectors or reindoctrinated
prisoners. Defectors also make excellent instructors and
guides for an infiltrating unit. In using a disguised team,
the selected men should be trained, oriented, and disguised
to look and act like authentic underground or guerrilla
units. In addition to acquiring valuable information, the
infiltrating units can demoralize the insurgents to the
extent that they become overly suspicious and distrustful of
their own units.
After establishing the cordon and designating a holding area,
the screening point or center is established. All civilians
in the cordoned area will then pass through the screening
center to be classified.
National police personnel will complete, if census data does
not exist in the police files, a basic registration card and
photograph all personnel over the age of 15. They print two
copies of each photo- one is pasted to the registration card
and the other to the village book (for possible use in later
operations and to identify ralliers and informants).
The screening element leader ensures the screeners question
relatives, friends, neighbors, and other knowledgeable
individuals of guerrilla leaders or functionaries operating
in the area on their whereabouts, activities, movements, and
expected return.
The screening area must include areas where police and
military intelligence personnel can privately interview
selected individuals. The interrogators try to convince the
interviewees that their cooperation will not be detected by
the other inhabitants. They also discuss, during the
interview, the availability of monetary rewards for certain
types of information and equipment.
Civilian
Self-Defense Forces [Paramilitaries, or, especially in an
El-Salvador or Colombian civil war context, right wing "death
squads"]
When
a village accepts the CSDF program, the insurgents cannot
choose to ignore it. To let the village go unpunished will
encourage other villages to accept the government's CSDF
program. The insurgents have no choice; they have to attack
the CSDF village to provide a lesson to other villages
considering CSDF. In a sense, the psychological effectiveness
of the CSDF concept starts by reversing the insurgent
strategy of making the government the repressor. It forces
the insurgents to cross a critical threshold-that of
attacking and killing the very class of people they are
supposed to be liberating.
To be successful, the CSDF program must have popular support
from those directly involved or affected by it. The average
peasant is not normally willing to fight to his death for his
national government. His national government may have been a
succession of corrupt dictators and inefficient bureaucrats.
These governments are not the types of institutions that
inspire fight-to-the-death emotions in the peasant. The
village or town, however, is a different matter. The average
peasant will fight much harder for his home and for his
village than he ever would for his national government. The
CSDF concept directly involves the peasant in the war and
makes it a fight for the family and village instead of a
fight for some faraway irrelevant government.
Members of the CSDF receive no pay for their civil duties. In
most instances, however, they derive certain benefits from
voluntary service. These benefits can range from priority of
hire for CMO projects to a place at the head of ration lines.
In El Salvador, CSDF personnel (they were called civil
defense there) were given a U.S.-funded life insurance policy
with the wife or next of kin as the beneficiary. If a CSDF
member died in the line of duty, the widow or next of kin was
ceremoniously paid by an HN official. The HN administered the
program and a U.S. advisor who maintained accountability of
the funds verified the payment. The HN [Host Nation]
exercises administrative and visible control.
Responsiveness and speedy payment are essential in this
process since the widow normally does not have a means of
support and the psychological effect of the government
assisting her in her time of grief impacts on the entire
community. These and other benefits offered by or through the
HN government are valuable incentives for recruiting and
sustaining the CSDF.
The local CSDF members select their leaders and deputy
leaders (CSDF groups and teams) in elections organized by the
local authorities. In some cases, the HN [Host Nation]
appoints a leader who is a specially selected member of the
HN security forces trained to carry out this task. Such
appointments occurred in El Salvador where the armed forces
have established a formal school to train CSDF commanders.
Extreme care and close supervision are required to avoid
abuses by CSDF leaders.
The organization of a CSDF can be similar to that of a combat
group. This organization is effective in both rural and urban
settings. For example, a basic group, having a strength of
107 members, is broken down into three 35-man elements plus a
headquarters element of 2 personnel. Each 35-man element is
further broken down into three 1 l-man teams and a
headquarters element of 2 personnel. Each team consists of a
team leader, an assistant team leader, and three 3-man cells.
This organization can be modified to accommodate the number
of citizens available to serve.
Weapons training for the CSDF personnel is critical. Skill at
arms decides the outcome of battle and must be stressed. Of
equal importance is the maintenance and care of weapons. CSDF
members are taught basic rifle marksmanship with special
emphasis on firing from fixed positions and during conditions
of limited visibility. Also included in the marksmanship
training program are target detection and fire discipline.
Training ammunition is usually allocated to the CSDF on the
basis of a specified number of rounds for each authorized
weapon. A supporting HN government force or an established
CSDF logistic source provides the ammunition to support
refresher training.
Acts
of misconduct by HN [Host Nation] personnel
All members of training assistance teams must understand
their responsibilities concerning acts of misconduct by HN
personnel. Team members receive briefings before deployment
on what to do if they encounter or observe such acts. Common
Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions lists prohibited
acts by parties to the convention. Such acts are-
• Violence to life and person, in particular, murder,
mutilation, cruel treatment, and torture.
• Taking of hostages.
• Outrages against personal dignity, in particular,
humiliating and degrading treatment.
• Passing out sentences and carrying out executions without
previous judgment by a regularly constituted court that
affords all the official guarantees that are recog-nized as
indispensable by civilized people.
• The provisions in the above paragraph represent a level of
conduct that the United States expects each foreign country
to observe.
If team members encounter prohibited acts they can not stop,
they will disengage from the activity, leave the area if
possible, and report the incidents immediately to the proper
in-country U.S. authorities. The country team will identify
proper U.S. authorities during the team's initial briefing.
Team members will not discuss such matters with non-U.S.
Government authorities such as journalists and civilian
contractors.
Most insurgents' doctrinal and training documents stress the
use of pressure-type mines in the more isolated or less
populated areas. They prefer using commandtype mines in
densely populated areas. These documents stress that when
using noncommand-detonated mines, the insurgents use every
means to inform the local populace on their location,
commensurate with security regulations. In reality, most
insurgent groups suffer from various degrees of deficiency in
their C2 [Command & Control] systems. Their C2 does not
permit them to verify that those elements at the operational
level strictly follow directives and orders. In the case of
the Frente Farabundo Marti de la Liberation Nacional (FMLN)
in El Salvador, the individual that emplaces the mine is
responsible for its recovery after the engagement. There are
problems with this concept. The individual may be killed or
the security forces may gain control of the area. Therefore,
the recovery of the mine is next to impossible.
Homemade antipersonnel mines are used extensively in El
Salvador, Guatemala and Malaysia. (Eighty percent of all El
Salvadoran armed forces casualties in 1986 were due to mines;
in 1987, soldiers wounded by mines and booby traps averaged
50 to 60 per month.) The important point to remember is that
any homemade mine is the product of the resources available
to the insurgent group. Therefore, no two antipersonnel mines
may be the same in their configuration and materials.
Insurgent groups depend to a great extent on materials
discarded or lost by security forces personnel. The
insurgents not only use weapons, ammunition, mines, grenades,
and demolitions for their original purpose but also in
preparing expedient mines and booby traps.
A series of successful minings carried out by the Viet Cong
insurgents on the Cua Viet River, Quang Tri Province,
demonstrated their resourcefulness in countering minesweeping
tactics. Initially, chain-dragging sweeps took place morning
and evening. After several successful mining attacks, it was
apparent that they laid the mines after the minesweepers
passed. Then, the boats using the river formed into convoys
and transited the river with minesweepers 914 meters ahead
oft he convoy. Nevertheless, boats of the convoy were
successfully mined in mid-channel, indicating that the mines
were again laid after the minesweeper had passed, possibly by
using sampans. Several sampans were observed crossing or
otherwise using the channel between the minesweepers and the
convoy. The convoys were then organized so that the
minesweepers worked immediately ahead of the convoy. One
convoy successfully passed. The next convoy had its
minesweepers mined and ambushed close to the river banks.
Military
Advisors
Psychologically pressuring the HN [Host Nation] counterpart
may sometimes be successful. Forms of psychological pressure
may range from the obvious to the subtle. The advisor never
applies direct threats, pressure, or intimidation on his
counterpart Indirect psychological pressure may be applied by
taking an issue up the chain of command to a higher U.S.
commander. The U.S. commander can then bring his counterpart
to force the subordinate counterpart to comply. Psychological
pressure may obtain quick results but may have very negative
side effects. The counterpart will feel alienated and
possibly hostile if the advisor uses such techniques. Offers
of payment in the form of valuables may cause him to become
resentful of the obvious control being exerted over him. In
short, psychologically pressuring a counterpart is not
recommended. Such pressure is used only as a last resort
since it may irreparably damage the relationship between the
advisor and his counterpart
PSYOP
[Psychological Operations] Support for Military Advisors
The introduction of military advisors requires preparing the
populace with which the advisors are going to work. Before
advisors enter a country, the HN [Host Nation] government
carefully explains their introduction and clearly emphasizes
the benefits of their presence to the citizens. It must
provide a credible justification to minimize the obvious
propaganda benefits the insurgents could derive from this
action. The country's dissenting elements label our actions,
no matter how well-intended, an "imperialistic intervention."
Once advisors are committed, their activities should be
exploited. Their successful integration into the HN [Host
Nation] society and their respect for local customs and
mores, as well as their involvement with CA [Civil Affairs]
projects, are constantly brought to light. In formulating a
realistic policy for the use of advisors, the commander must
carefully gauge the psychological climate of the HN [Host
Nation] and the United States.
PRC
[Population & Resources Control] Operations.
Advisors assist their counterparts in developing proper
control plans and training programs for PRC measures. They
also help coordinate plans and requests for materiel and
submit recommendations to improve the overall effectiveness
of operations. They can be helpful in preparing to initiate
control.
• Select, organize, and train paramilitary and irregular
forces.
• Develop PSYOP [Psychological Operations] activities to
support PRC operations.
• Coordinate activities through an area coordination center
(if established).
• Establish and refine PRC operations.
• Intensify intelligence activities.
• Establish and refine coordination and communications with
other agencies.
References
1. ↑ Newsweek.Special Forces May Train Assassins, Kidnappers
in Iraq by Michael Hirsh & John Barry, Jan. 14, 2005,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6802629/site/newsweek/print/1/displaymode/1098/
2. ↑ US State Department, FOIA record,
http://foia.state.gov/documents/elsalvad/738d.PDF